http://www.juancole.com/2009/09/tohidi-women-and-presidential-elections.html
Nayereh Tohidi
Iranian Women figured prominently in the 10th presidential elections of June
2009, in which Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was declared the winner by a wide margin. In
large pre-election rallies and intense campaigns and during the post-election
upheaval women played a visible and active role. Several internal conflicts
within the ruling elites, including long-existing cracks within the ranks of
the Shiite clerics and also between the people and the state came to the fore
during and after the presidential elections. Women in large numbers joined the
massive street protests that followed the vote, as opposition candidates and
their supporters raised accusations of wholesale fraud in the official results
and declared it an “electoral coup.”
The international media, often unaware of the brewing women’s movement in Iran
, were surprised to see women marching in the demonstrations in large numbers
and braving the violent response by security forces, which dramatically
illustrated the clash between a changing society and an increasingly repressive
government. But the massive participation of women in the latest protests is
not an unprecedented, overnight development. This has been the result of many
years of rather quiet educational and organizational work carried out by many small
groups of women and men focused on civil rights, especially women’s rights.
Women’s social activism and participation in political movements in modern Iran
has more than 100 years of recorded history, with special highlights during the
Constitutional Revolution of 1906–1911, the nationalist movement of the 1950s,
the modernization and reform processes of the 1960s and 1970s, and the Islamic
Revolution of 1978–79.[1]
What is unprecedented is not the massive quantity, but a new quality of women’s
participation, which is marked by a high level of gender consciousness,
self-confidence, and feminist agency. During the 1979 Revolution too, thousands
of women, mostly covered in black veils, rallied behind Ayatollah Khomeini
under a populist Islamist discourse envisioning a utopian and just Islamic
society. But the current social uprising is neither revolutionary nor
sectarian. It is a nonviolent and non-ideological pro-democracy movement in
which demands for individual freedom and civil rights, including women’s
rights, constitute its important components.
Women from all walks of life, but mostly young and urban middle class women,
took part in both the electoral campaigns and in the protests against the
results, which were widely viewed as being fraudulent. While some among these
women participants were devout women covered in the traditional black chadors,
many others appeared in colorful scarves, modern fashions, and secular looks.
Unlike the demonstrations orchestrated by the government that we were used to seeing
over the past 30 years, these rather spontaneous protests have not been sex
segregated. Women marched not behind men, but alongside men or even in the
forefront.
The nightly cries of “Allah-o-Akbar” (God is great) and “Death to the Dictator”
on the roof tops are similar to those during the 1978–79 Revolution. Unlike
then, however, the current movement is not dominated by sectarian and
revolutionary Islamism. Nor is the revolutionary Marxism-Leninism of the
guerrilla movements of the 1970s present in the current movement. While a
populist, religious fundamentalist (Islamist) and anti-imperialist discourse
led by Ayatollah Khomeini was predominant in Iran in the 1970s, today a
pluralist, and predominantly secular discourse based on human/women’s rights,
civil rights, and the democratic rule of law makes up the main framework of the
current movement. By secular, I do not mean anti-religion or even irreligious,
but an adherence to the separation of state and religion. This growing secular
tendency in Iran rejects theocracy, the supremacy of the clerical power in
politics, and the absolute rule of the jurist (velayat-e motlaqeh faqih) and
aspires to create a secular republic based on free elections and parliamentary
democracy. In other word, the dominant mindset in the current movement is
post-Islamist and non-ideological.
Several inter-related and at times paradoxical factors have contributed to this
evolutionary process. Among recent changes at the local and national levels in
Iran are the demographic changes such as increased urbanization and the youth
bulge in Iran’s rising population; the dramatic increase in literacy and
educational attainment, especially among women, who now make up 63 percent of
university enrollment; the remarkable decline in fertility rates thanks to a
successful campaign for birth control and family planning along with an
improvement in primary health care; the rise in women’s socio-political
participation; and the increase in women’s contribution to economic,
scientific, and cultural production in the arts, literature, and cinema.
The interplay of these internal changes with certain changes at the
international and global levels, especially the impact of globalizing factors
such as the new communication technology (including the Internet, mobile
phones, and satellite TV) and the global currency of human rights discourse and
feminism promoted by the United Nations and by supportive devices such as CEDAW
[2] that are being ratified by an increasing number of member states of the UN
have all contributed to the transformations manifested in the current movement
for democracy in Iran.
The socializing and politicizing impacts of the 1979 Revolution on women,
especially on the traditional and conservative segments of women’s population
helped expand the size and influence of middle class women in Iranian society.
Initially formed during the years of modernization under the Pahlavi dynasty in
1920s to 1970s, the modern middle class, urban women of Iran made up the core
of the women’s groups who resisted the discriminatory policies and laws enacted
under the Islamist government since 1979.
They were later joined by an increasing number of Islamic women activists and
devout Muslim women members of the traditionalist and conservative strata who
gradually became disillusioned with the Islamist utopia and moved toward a
reformist reconstruction of the polity and a feminist reinterpretation of their
faith. This was due to their encounter with patriarchal injustices such as
polygamy, temporary marriages, male privileges in divorce, child custody, and
inheritance, and many other discriminatory laws and policies reinforced by the
Islamic Republic. The increasing socioeconomic or class disparity, corruption,
and particularly the government repression of individual freedoms and civil
rights turned many female and male members of the younger generations away from
the Islamist state.
Therefore, the youth, especially the student movement and the women’s movement
make up now the main forces of the current civil rights effort and constitute
the primary agents of change and democratization in Iran .
Women’s Role in the Election Process
Elections in Iran are neither free nor fair. People are allowed to choose only
among a few candidates who have passed the screening process and been vetted by
an unelected body called the Guardian Council.[3] It was only a few months
before the June 12 elections that the overall mood shifted from political
apathy and hopelessness to a sense of hope for change, which resulted in a vast
mobilization to participate in voting. This was mainly due to the progressive
platforms for change presented by the two reformist front-runners: Mir-Hossein
Mousavi and Mehdi Karrubi. What distinguished the reform candidates from the
incumbent president Ahmadinejad was their promises to stop the latter’s
onslaught on civil rights, to improve the rights of women and religious and
ethnic minorities, to mend the mismanaged economy (marked by 25 percent
inflation and rising unemployment), and to change the hostile and
confrontational foreign policy and militarization that have resulted in the UN
resolutions against Iran, economic sanctions, and the threat of Western
military attacks and war, which have created an overall sense of national
insecurity and isolation.
Among women activists too, it took a while to overcome the widespread hesitance
to engage in the electoral process, especially by those who had lost all hope
for political reform and trust in any of the candidates. About three months
before the Election Day, however, an increasing number of feminists and women’s
groups decided to take advantage of the relative openness of the political
atmosphere during the election times in order to render an active feminist
intervention into the process. They formed a diverse coalition called
Convergence of Women (Hamgarayee Zanan) that represented 42 women’s groups and
700 individual activists. The coalition pressed the presidential candidates on
two specific sets of women’s demands: ratification of CEDAW and revision of
four Articles (19, 20, 21, and 115) in the constitution that enshrine
gender-based discrimination.[4] Though as individuals, many feminists did take
sides and voted for one of the two reform candidates, the coalition remained a
demand-centered (motalebeh-mehvar) campaign only and avoided endorsement of any
particular candidate. It rather put each candidate on the spot to address
women’s issues and respond to the demands specified by the coalition.
The coalition tried to bring women’s issues to the surface through their
publications and through appearances in the media, on the campaign trails and
at street rallies, press conferences, and interviews with the candidates. They
effectively utilized the new communication technology (SMS via cell phones,
e-mails, and the Internet) to network and mobilize activists. Meanwhile, a film
made by a prominent feminist director, Rakhshan Banietemad, put all of these
efforts together in a documentary accessible on the Internet. The film included
revealing interviews on women’s issues with some prominent artists and the
presidential candidates while they were sitting along with their wives. Except
for Ahmadinejad, the three other presidential candidates agreed to participate.
It should be noted that prior to the 2009 electoral campaigns, a new wave of
women’s collective activism had already brought women’s demands for equal
rights into the political scene. Following a growing trend in activities of
women’s press and women NGOs since 1998 and some street demonstrations in 2004
and 2005, a number of organized and focused collective campaigns took shape
since 2006. The largest, most grassroots and influential one has been the One
Million Signatures Campaign to change discriminatory laws.[5] Other campaigns
and coalitions included: the Stop Stoning Forever Campaign; the Women for Equal
Citizenship Campaign; the Women’s Access to Public Stadiums Campaign; the
National Women’s Charter Campaign; and the Mothers for Peace.[6] Despite the
peaceful and transparent nature of the Iranian women’s movement, many women’s
activists have faced state repression such as smear campaigns by the state-run
media, beating, and arrests by security forces. In the course of the five years
prior to the presidential elections, over 70 women activists were arrested and
taken to Evin Prison and charged with “disruption of public opinion,”
“propagating against the state”, and “endangering of national security.” While
most of detainees were released on bail in a few weeks, some have been sentenced
to several months or even several years of imprisonment.[7]
All of these efforts contributed to the visible changes in the gender politics
of the 10th presidential election in 2009, which distinguished it from previous
races. For one, all of the three candidates running against Ahmadinejad
promised to address women’s demands raised by the coalition and to also include
woman ministers in their cabinets should they get elected. The front-runner
candidate, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, was usually accompanied by his wife, Zahra
Rahnavard, with whom he held hands—a bold and unprecedented act in the Iranian
sex-segregated political culture. Rahnavard, a prominent Muslim woman activist,
an accomplished writer, academic, and artist is the first woman to become a
university president in Iran . Her stature, strong personality, outspokenness
about human/women’s rights, and colorful headscarf were among the traits that
added to the appeal of this couple as a promising choice for change.
The other reform candidate, Mehdi Karrubi, also conducted a much more
woman-friendly campaign than the one he ran in 2005 during the previous
elections. Though a clergyman, his campaign team—composed of some respected
reformers—included a prominent woman activist, Jamila Kadivar, as the spokesperson
of his campaign headquarters. His wife, a strong professional woman, was also
actively involved in the management of his campaign. Even the conservative
candidate, Mohsen Rezai, was seen accompanied by his wife in several campaign
meetings. Finally, Ahmadinejad himself felt compelled to bring along his wife
during one of campaign events.
In short, both in symbolism and content, the 10th presidential elections
signified considerable progress in gender politics in Iran . This progress has
been mainly due to years of slow but persistent efforts by women toward
consciousness-raising and feminist interventions in cultural and political
arenas. As briefly mentioned above, in recent years, the women’s rights
movement in Iran has been manifested in feminist press (print journals as well
as online web logs and websites); arts, literature, and movies; organized and
focused collective campaigns through networking; and other activities in
various NGOs.[8]
Women’s Role in the Post-Election Uprising
As discussed earlier, women’s presence in the post-election Green Movement has
been as prominent as the one in the election process. The prevalence of
artistic images, songs, and poetry, especially the choice of the color green as
the unifying symbol, gave the reform camp a sort of “feminine” tone. This
rather spiritual, artistic, and peaceful mood that predominated because of the
presence of many young people, especially young women, continued during the
first days of protests in the aftermath of the election.
In the vote’s aftermath, millions of marchers, while flashing victory signs
(instead of clenched fists), carried green-colored banners with the slogan:
“Where is My Vote?” This simple yet profound slogan signifies a prevalent
keenness on civil and political rights. The color green signifies symbolism
rooted in both the national Islamic and the secular, pre-Islamic mythology and
poetry of Iran but also as the global color of peace, nonviolence and
environmental protection.
Despite increasingly violent suppression, over 3000 arrests and around 60
deaths (according to official figures), the activists who are engaged in the
Green Movement so far have remained, for the most part, non-violent. Women’s
roles as political actors, journalists, lawyers, and activist demonstrators are
clearly evident in the increasing number of women who are beaten, injured,
killed, or arrested as political prisoners since the June 12 upheavals.[9]
Even the first icon of the current civil rights movement is a woman: Neda
Agha-Soltan, who was gunned down by the government-controlled militia while
peacefully demonstrating. Her death was captured by a cell phone camera for all
the world’s eyes to see, and it turned her into a martyr, which inspired more
demonstrations and the outrage that followed.
Neda’s characteristics are representative of some of the demographic, gender,
and class orientations of the current civil rights movement in Iran . Her young
age (27 years old) reminds us of the 70 percent of Iran’s population below age
30 who are faced with increasing rates of unemployment, socio-political
repression, and humiliation should Ahmadinejad’s repressive and militaristic
policies continue for another four years. Neda’s Azeri ethnic background
reminds us of Iran ’s ethnic diversity and the ongoing tension between the
center and peripheries over socioeconomic disparity, discrimination, and uneven
distribution of power and resources. Neda’s choice of field of study, theology
and philosophy, was based on her quest to find answers to the questions of her
time. But, as described by her mother, she became disappointed with the
increasingly repressive atmosphere of the universities and so she turned to
private training in music. Her music teacher was actually with her on the day
of the protest (June 20, 2009) and was at her side when she was shot.[10] Neda
belonged to no political party or ideological group. Her quest was basically
for freedom and a democratic society that would respect her human rights and
dignity as a woman.
Another icon of this movement, a 19 year-old male student, Sohrab Árabi, was
reportedly killed while in the custody of the security forces. He became a
rallying point mainly due to his mother’s daring to speak out about her ordeal.
Parvin Fahimi, who finally recovered the body of her son after three weeks of
searching from one prison to another, has become a leading advocate of families
of political prisoners and mothers of martyred activists who have formed a new
women’s group called Mothers in Mourning (Madaran-e Azadar).[11] To commemorate
their lost children and also demand the release of the arrested ones, mothers
of martyrs and political prisoners hold once-a-week rallies in designated
public parks in Tehran. Following a call by Shirin Ebadi, a leading human
rights lawyer and Nobel Laureate for Peace 2003, Iranian mothers in other parts
of Iran and the world have begun holding similar rallies on a weekly basis as a
show of global solidarity with women in Iran .
A Post-Islamist Paradigm Shift in Iran ’s Political Culture
The Green Movement is a home-grown product of a long quest for reform,
democracy, and rule of law in Iran . Ironically, it emerged from within the
former revolutionary Islamists disillusioned with totalitarian Islamism and was
welcomed by many secular dissident groups who have suffered from years of
repression and marginalization under the Islamist regime. This cracking from
within is in part due to the internal contradictions embedded in the
institutional hybrid called the “Islamic Republic.” In the face of a growing
movement for democracy and secular rule of law, the tense coexistence of its
theocratic, unelected component (Islamic) with the elected popular authority
(Republic) now seems untenable.
In the aftermath of what many called the “electoral coup,” the state power is
taken over by the increasingly powerful hard-line military (the Revolutionary
Guard) and its conservative clerical allies. This alliance seems determined to
erode the republican part of the IR hybrid regime and further consolidate its theocratic
and unelected component as the real power. But new cracks along with the
long-existing ones within the ranks of the Shii clerics seem to be deepening
and multiplying. The post-election wave of repression; the violent crackdown on
peaceful and legal demonstrations, torture, show trials and lies, and the
revelation of cases of rape and sexual abuse of the political prisoners have
expanded people’s distrust of and resentment toward the government, hence a
legitimacy crisis for the regime.
Ahmadinejad was the only one among the four candidates running for presidency
who made no mention of women’s issues in his platform. His first term of
presidency too was not only negligent of women’s demands but also associated
with more retrogressive gender policies such as the proposition of the infamous
“Family Bill” in 2008 to facilitate polygamy. Yet, at the beginning of his
second term in August 2009, Ahmadinejad surprised many by announcing the
nomination of three women to his new cabinet as ministers of education, health,
and welfare and social security. This move, unprecedented in the history of the
Islamic Republic, was unexpected and will probably prove unacceptable by his
conservative allies, especially the clerics in Qum and may not receive enough
votes of approval in the Majlis (parliament).
His opponents, on the other hand, women’s rights activists in particular, see
this move as a sheer hypocrisy and a deceptive political show. This, they
argue, displays Ahmadinejad’s desperate attempt to appease women who have
become his main challengers. Furthermore, the hardliner background of the
nominated women indicates that Ahmadinejad is planning to instrumentally use
these women against the women’s rights movement. Though highly educated, all
the three nominated women have very negative records concerning women’s rights.
They have played active roles in support of anti-women legislations such as the
notorious “Family Bill” and in opposition to progressive reforms.
Iran ’s situation remains fluid as new developments unfold. The prospect for
women’s rights, especially in the medium and long terms, seems to be promising
and hopeful. The growing quest for democracy is finally becoming intertwined
with women’s rights. This is indicative of a paradigm shift in Iran ’s political
culture and intellectual discourse. In the background of the latest changes in
gender politics in Iran , even Ahmadinejad would feel compelled to show some
positive gestures in his gender policies. But with the numerous women activists
arrested, beaten, imprisoned, and some even killed under his presidency, he can
hardly convince people of his good intention toward improvement of women’s
status.[12]
The main subject of discussion among the Iranian advocates of women’s rights at
present is how to integrate women’s demands with the broader quest for reform
and democracy in the face of the increasing repression. They are seeking ways
to continue rendering a feminist intervention in the current democracy movement
in order to assure its direction is toward a nonviolent, nonsectarian,
pluralistic, and egalitarian future. This is a daunting struggle, yet also an
exciting and inspiring process, from which global feminism, especially women
activists in Muslim communities, can learn many new lessons.
NOTES
[1] For studies on the history of the women’s movement in Iran , see for
instance: Eliz Sanasarian. The Women’s Rights Movement in Iran (New York:
Praeger, 1982); Parvin Paidar. Women and the Political Process in Twentieth
Century Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Nikki Keddie.
Modern Iran : Roots and Results of Revolution ( New Haven : Yale University
Press, 2003); Janet Afary. The Iranian Constitutional Revolution (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1996); and Nayereh Tohidi. “The International
Connections of the Women’s Movement in Iran : 1979-2000” in Iran and the
Surrounding World: Interaction in Culture and Cultural Politics, edited by
Nikki Keddie and Rudi Matthee ( Seattle : University of Washington Press ,
2002), 205-231.
[2] CEDAW, the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination
against Women was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1979. Currently, 185
countries - over ninety percent of the members of the United Nations - are
party to the Convention. During the reform oriented presidency of Mohamad
Khatami (1997-2005), CEDAW was passed in parliament in 2003, albeit with
several reservations. But the Guardian Council blocked its ratification and the
final decision was left upon another body, the Expediency Council. The latter
has kept it shelved since then and the hardliners in power have not even tried
to reconsider this convention.
[3] The Guardian Council is composed of six clerics appointed by the unelected
supreme leader and six jurists selected by the head of the judiciary for
approval by the Majlis. This powerful body vets legislation, political
candidates and election results.
[4] For information on this coalition see:
http://www.feministschool.com/spip.php?article2461
[5] Visit their Web sites at:
http://www.sign4change.info/english/spip.php?article18
http://zanschool.net/english/spip.php?rubrique3
[6] For more information and documentation on these campaigns, see Nayereh
Tohidi “The Women’s Movement and Feminism in Iran: A Glocal Perspective,” in
Women's Movements in a Global Era edited by Amrita Basu, Westview Press,
forthcoming, and also Rochelle Terman, "The Contemporary Iranian Women's
Rights Movement," Women Living Under Muslim Laws, (forthcoming).
[7] See, for example:
http://www.feministschool.com/english/spip.php?rubrique5
http://www.meydaan.com/english/default.aspx
[8] For some analysis by women activists inside Iran about the role of women’s
movement in the current uprising see, for example:
Noushin Ahmadi Khorasani, “Ten Days that Shook Iran,” July 30, 2009:
http://www.feministschool.com/english/spip.php?article322
Asal Akhavan “Three Years after the Campaign of One Million Signatures,” July
2009:
http://www.sign4change.info/spip.php?article4554
[9] On arrested women activists and the conditions of women prisoners, see the
following report by Shadi Sadr, a prominent feminist lawyer written after her
own release from Evin prison:
http://www.meydaan.com/Showarticle.aspx?arid=883
For more information on imprisoned women journalists and other activists, see:
http://wluml.org/english/newsfulltxt.shtml?cmd[157]=x-157-565012
[10] See the witness report at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8119713.stmn
[11] Visit their Web site at: http://www.mournfulmothers.blogfa.com/
[12] See, for example, the following commentaries by women activists against
Ahmadinejad’s appointment of women to his cabinet: Massoumeh Torfeh, “Hardline
women won’t help Iran ” in Guardian, 17 August 2009:
http://www.guardian .co.uk/commentis free/2009/ aug/17/iran- cabinet-women
Nahid Tavassoli. “Entekhab Vazir Zan, chera Hala?” [Election of Women
Ministers, Why Now?]: http://www.feministschool.com/spip.php?article3065
Mahboubeh Abassgholizadeh. “Sexist Views of the Head of the Government”:
http://meydaan.info/wwShow.aspx?wwid=1605
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Nayereh Tohidi is a Professor in the Gender and Women’s
Studies Department at California State University , Northridge and a Research
Associate at the Center for Near Eastern Studies at UCLA, where she has been
coordinating the Bilingual Lecture Series on Iran since 2003.